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COMMENTAIRES 
THE RESPONSE OF WAGES TO THE REMOVAL 
OF CONTROLS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
Frank Reid 
From August 1971 to April 1974 a program of wage and price 
controls was in effect in the United States which was, in some respects, 
similar to the Canadian controls program. In both countries mandatory 
controls were implemented about five years following the termination of 
a voluntary controls policy. It is also interesting that in both countries 
controls were introduced in a surprise policy reversai by administrations 
which had taken strong political stands against controls. In view of the 
similar circumstances surrounding the implementation of controls and 
the basic similarity of the two économies, an examination of the U.S. 
expérience with controls seems worthwhile. 
The basic format of the U.S. controls program is reviewed in 
Section 1. In Section 2 a model is developed to explain the rate of wage 
change and, in Section 3, the model is used to measure the effect of 
controls on the rate of wage change, both while controls are in force 
and when the controls are removed. The final section draws conclusions 
from the results of the empirical analysis. 
AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. WAGE CONTROLS 
U.S. peacetime expérience with wage controls began with the an-
nouncement of a set of wage and price Guideposts in January 1962 in the 
Economie Report ofthe Président. The économie situation prior to their 
introduction was one in which unemployment was high and inflation was 
low (0.6% during 1961). The Guideposts were intended to reduce the 
inflationary impact of adopting an expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy. The basis of the policy was that wage increases were to be 
limited to the national rate of productivity growth, which in a sub-
séquent report was specified as 3.2% per year. Price changes were to be 
related to unit costs, implying that priées would rise in industries with 
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below average productivity growth, fall in industries with above average 
productivity growth rates, and resuit in a stable aggregate price level. 
The Guideposts were not enforced through detailed régulations — 
instead the government relied on ad hoc intervention in "key" wage and 
price décisions. The best known example is Président Kennedy's 
dramatic confrontation with the steel industry in April 1962, but there 
were many other less well publicized cases of intervention by the 
government in price and wage décisions in which a wide variety of 
methods were used in an attempt to obtain compliance with the policy. 
By the end of 1966, however, the inflation rate had risen to 3.3% 
and it was obvious that in this situation the government could not 
ask unions to settle for the 3.2% Guidepost. The administration was 
reluctant to set a new higher Guidepost and, in January 1967, the 
guidepost policy was essentially abandoned in the Council of Economie 
Advisors annual report. 
The Economie Report of the Président in the following few years 
referred disparagingly to wage and price controls as a possible policy 
alternative. Strong statements were made to the effect that controls 
were ineffective, inéquitable, unworkable, and the least désirable of 
policy alternatives. On August 15, 1971 the Président announced a 
controls program in a surprise policy reversai. The légal authority for 
the program was provided in the Economie Stabilization Act of 1970 
which had been passed by a Démocratie Congress, allegedly to embar-
rass a Republican Président who was ideologically opposed to controls. 
Phase I of the controls program was an immédiate 90 day freeze on 
wages, priées and rents. Authority was delegated by the Président to the 
cabinet-level Cost of Living Council which then administered the 
program through the Office of Emergency Preparedness. 
The wage control component of the program froze wages at the 
level in effect during the month prior to the announcement of the pro-
gram. There was some reluctance to disallow deferred wage increases 
which were specified in contracts negotiated in good faith before the 
freeze. It was decided, however, that on the grounds of equity they 
must be disallowed — to do otherwise would be unfair to workers 
who were not covered by contracts. The Internai Revenue Service 
undertook over 85,000 spot checks during the freeze and reported over 
90 percent compliance (U.S. Président, 1972, p. 84). 
Phase II of the program was implemented on November 15, 1971 
with the objective of reducing inflation to 2-3% by the end of 1972. The 
guidelines established were that pay increases should be limited to 5-72% 
per year which, with a 3% productivity growth rate, was expected 
reduce inflation to 2-xk% per year. 
Two new bodies were established to administer the program, the 
Pay Board and the Price Commission. The Pay Board was initially a 
tripartite board of 15 members, 5 each from business, labour and the 
public. In March 1972, however, four of the five labour members 
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withdrew from the Board as a resuit of a disagreement over the Pacific 
longshoreman's seulement. Business représentation on the Board was 
then also reduced to maintain the labour-management balance. 
For administrative purposes wage settlements were divided into 
three tiers. Tier 1, settlements affecting 5,000 or more workers (10% of 
ail employées) required prior approval by The Pay Board. Settlements 
in Tier 2, i.e. those affecting 1000 to 5000 employées (7% of ail em-
ployées) were required to be reported to the Pay Board ; and settlements 
in Tier 3, i.e. those affecting less than 1000 workers (83% of ail 
employées), required no reports but were subject to monitoring and 
spot checks. 
In December 1971 the Economie Stabilization Act, which was 
scheduled to expire in April 1972, was extended to April 1973 by 
Congress and substantially amended. The policy which emerged was 
that generally, deferred increases negotiated prior to Phase I were to be 
allowed, and rétroactive payments were permitted for income lost during 
the Phase I freeze. There were numerous provisions for exceptions 
from the guideline. A three-year catchup provision was provided allow-
ing increases up to 7% to workers who had averaged less than 7% in the 
past three years. Increases up to 7% would also be allowed in situations 
where a "tandem relationship" existed, or where deemed necessary by 
the Pay Board to attract or retain essential labour. There were no 
restrictions on the "working poor" (a term which the Courts interpreted 
to mean those earning less than $2.75 per hour), a group which 
included over 40 percent of the workers in the private nonfarm sector. 
Finally, ail workers in firms (except construction and health) with 60 or 
less employées were exempt from controls. 
Phase III was implemented in January 1973. The Pay Board and 
the Price Commission ceased to operate and the program was one of 
voluntary restraint with some monitoring by the Cost of Living Council. 
The voluntary restraint program of Phase III was found to be 
unsatisfactory and was replaced by Phase IV in August 1973, which 
reimposed the mandatory controls of Phase II. In an attempt to achieve 
a smooth transition to an uncontrolled economy and avoid an "explo-
sion" of wages and priées at the end of the program, a policy of 
sector by sector decontrol was also implemented. Phase IV ended 
when the Economie Stabilization Act, which had been renewed for an 
additional year, expired on April 30, 1974. 
THE WAGE EQUATION 
In order to assess the effects of controls on the rate of wage 
change, it is necessary to hâve a model to predict what the rate of wage 
change would hâve been in the absence of controls. It is essential to 
employ such a model in assessing the effects of controls because, 
when controls are introduced other things are not held constant. It can 
be highly misleading to simply observe whether the rate of wage change 
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rose or fell when controls were introduced and to attribute any change 
to controls. In many instances, though, policy discussions do not rise 
beyond this rather inadéquate level. 
The rate of wage change is measured by the quarter-to-quarter per-
centage change in average hourly earnings, converted to an annual rate. l 
The explanatory variables employed are the expected inflation rate, the 
job vacancy rate, the change in the job vacancy rate, and three 
seasonal dummy variables to capture seasonal bargaining patteras. The 
model was estimated by OLS using quarterly data over the 21 year 
period 1955-1 to 1975-IV, excluding the four Phases of controls. 
The expected inflation variable was constructed using a weak form 
of the rational expectations hypothesis. More specifically, an expected 
inflation variable was constructed by regressing the current inflation 
rate on the inflation rates in the previous four quarters, with weights 
constrained to foliow a linear pattern.2 
The job vacancy rate séries was constructed using the index of 
Help-Wanted Advertising published in The Conférence Board Statistical 
Bulletin. Maximum explanatory power was achieved using the current 
and one-period lagged value of the inverse of the job vacancy rate. 
This spécification of the model avoids some of the more common 
statistical problems with wage équations. In particular, using the one-
quarter rather than the four-quarter change in the wage index as the 
dépendent variable avoids inducing autocorrélation; the fact that the 
expected inflation variable does not include the current inflation rate 
avoids simultaneous équation bias; and the use of the vacancy rate 
rather than the unemployment rate avoids the problem that the unem-
ployment rate may not be a consistent measure of labour market condi-
tions over time due to changes in the démographie structure of the 
labour force and the amount of structural unemployment in the economy. 
The model performs reasonably well when assessed by the usual 
criteria. The coefficients are of the expected magnitude and statistically 
significant, there is no évidence of autocorrélation, the équation explains 
57% of the variation in the dépendent variable, and an F-test does not 
show any structural instability over time. 
THE RESPONSE OF WAGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND REMOVAL OF CONTROLS 
Table 1 summarizes the results of using the model to measure the 
effect of controls on the rate of wage change. For each period of 
controls the Table shows the wage guideline (or target) established by 
the government and the estimated réduction in the rate of wage change 
1
 For détails of the statistical tests reported in this paper see REID (1977). 
2
 The four quarter distributed lag gave maximum explanatory power. F-tests 
indicated that at the .95 confidence level the linear constraint could not be rejected and 
higher order polynomials did not add significantly to explanatory power. 
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due to controls. The table also displays an effectiveness coefficient (k) 
which expresses any réduction in the rate of wage change due to 
controls as a fraction of the différence between the announced guide-
line and the rate of increase which would hâve occurred without 
controls. The effectiveness coefficient can vary between zéro for a 
completely ineffective controls period, and unity for completely 
effective controls. 
TABLE 1 


































































1962-1 to 1966-1V 3.2% - 1 . 8 * 0.4* -0 .7 
1971-IV 0.0% -4 .0* 0.6* 3.9* 
1972-1 to 1972-IV 5.5% 0.5 0.0* n.a. 
1973-1 to 1973-11 5.5% - 0 . 3 0.0 n.a. 
1973-IH to 1974-1 5.5% -3 .9* 0.4* 2.9* 
Note : Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level. Dates 
for the wage explosions are: Guideposts, 1967-1 to 1967-IV; Phase I, 1972-1; 
Phase IV, 1974-11 to 1974-IV. The symbol "n .a . " indicates that the test for an 
explosion is not applicable since controls had no restraining effect while in force. 
In assessing any controls policy it is crucial to examine the 
behaviour of wages (and priées) when controls are removed in order to 
détermine if any restraining effect of controls is partially or totally 
offset by an "explosion" when controls are removed. An "explosion" 
of wages is defined to be an increase in the rate of wage change above 
the rate predicted, given the actual values of the explanatory variables. 
Thus, in order to measure the amount of any wage explosion, the 
wage équation is required to predict what would hâve occurred if 
controls had not been implemented. The final column of Table 1 présents 
the results of using a shift dummy to measure the amount of wage 
explosion which occurred following effective periods of controls. 
Phase I, the 90 day freeze, was found, not surprisingly, to be the 
most effective period of controls (k = 0.6). This resulted in a réduction 
in the rate of increase of average hourly earnings by 4.0 percentage 
points during the period that the controls were in force. It was found, 
however, that when Phase I terminated an "explosion" in the rate of 
wage change occurred which almost completely offset the réduction 
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Phase IV and the Guideposts were both found to be substantially 
effective while in force (k = 0.4), reducing the rate of wage change 
by 3.9 and 1.8 percentage points respectively. However, Phase IV was 
followed by an explosion which offset most of the réduction during 
controls, whereas there was no évidence of such an explosion following 
the Guideposts. 
During Phase II and Phase III there was no évidence of controls 
restraining the rate of wage change, even while the controls were in 
force. Thus it was not necessary to test for an explosion at the end of 
thèse periods. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. WAGE CONTROL PROGRAM 
The empirical évidence presented above indicates substantial 
heterogeneity in the effect of controls on the rate of wage change in the 
five periods considered. In two of the periods there was no measurable 
effect, even while the controls were in force ; in two other periods the 
effects while the controls were in force were offset by an explosion 
when controls were removed ; and in the fifth case controls were effective 
while in force and there was no évidence of an explosion when the 
controls were removed. An attempt will now be made to provide an 
explanation for thèse divergent results. 
In my view, the reason for the effectiveness of the Phase I 
controls while they were in force, and the explosion which followed, is 
simply that the freeze caused a postponement, until the end of the 90 
day period, of any new settlements or deferred increase that otherwise 
would hâve occurred. This is obviously not the basis for a lasting 
policy of restraint. The policy makers did not, of course, intend for 
new contracts to be settled at the "0% guideline" during the freeze. 
The goal was simply to allow time for administrative machinery to be 
established and possibly to achieve some political shock effect. When 
the freeze ended ail the postponed increases took effect, in addition to 
the normal round of new settlements, producing the explosion. 
The ineffectiveness of controls during Phase II is, I think, 
explained by the fact that most of the work force were eligible for 
exemptions of increases up to 7% (under the provisions for deferred 
increases, catchup, tandem relationships, and the working poor). Since 
the model predicts that the rate of wage change would hâve been just 
under 7% in the absence of controls, the lack of restraint due to the 
controls is understandable. Not much restraining effect can be expected 
when the effective guideline is above the rate of increase predicted 
without controls ! 
Phase III was also found to be ineffective, but for a différent 
reason. The lack of effectiveness resulted from an attempt to move 
from a program of mandatory restraint to one of voluntary restraint. It 
was, in effect, no restraint at ail. 
The Guideposts period and Phase IV were both found to be 
substantially effective while in force (k = 0.4) ; however a wage explo-
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sion occurred following Phase IV but not following the Guideposts. 
What is the explanation for this différence? 
An explanation suggested by économie theory is that the level of 
real wages in individual markets, and for the economy as a whole, is 
determined by basic économie factors such as marginal productivity, 
the degree of compétition in factor and product markets, etc. If controls 
displace any of thèse real magnitudes from their equilibrium levels, 
the equilibrium will be re-established by adjustments which occur 
when the controls are removed. Similarly, the level and rates of change 
of nominal priées and wages are determined by the money supply. If 
controls displace the equilibrium rates from that determined by 
monetary factors, the equilibrium will be re-established when controls 
are removed. 
The theoretical model outlined in the previous paragraph yields 
prédictions about the occurrence of explosions which allow the hypo-
thesis to be tested. The model predicts that an explosion of wages, 
but not priées, will occur following controls if the effect of controls is 
to reduce real wages, i.e. if controls were more effective in restraining 
wage increase than price increases. If controls reduce both wage and 
price inflation by corresponding amounts, i.e. there is no réduction of 
real wages, then controls are simply forcing unions to hold wage in-
creases down to what they would hâve negotiated if they had been able 
to correctly anticipate actual inflation. 
The model also predicts an explosion of both wages and priées 
will occur following controls if controls impose nominal rates of change 
of priées and wages which are inconsistent with basic monetary factors. 
To test this hypothesis an équation was estimated in which the 
dépendent variable was the quarter-to-quarter percentage change in the 
real wage. The results indicated that during the Guideposts there was 
no significant réduction in the rate of change of real wages, i.e. both 
priées and wages were restrained. During Phase IV, however, there 
was a significant réduction in the rate of change of real wages of 
approximately the same amount as the réduction in the rate of change 
of money wages; i.e. there was no measurable restraint of priées. 
Thus the prédictions of the model are confirmed — a wage explosion 
following Phase IV was required to restore the equilibrium level of 
real wages, but an explosion did not occur following the Guideposts 
because real wages were not reduced. 
In reviewing the évidence on the U.S. expérience with control and 
decontrol of wages, perhaps the most important lesson is that sweeping 
generalizations about the effectiveness of controls should be avoided. 
Various periods of controls can hâve quite différent effects and they 
should be analyzed accordingly. 
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LE CONTRÔLE ET LE DÉCONTRÔLE DES PRIX 
ET DES REVENUS: UN COMMENTAIRE 
CLAUDE MONTMARQUETTE 
La question des contrôles des prix et des revenus n'a cessé d'être 
commentée et débattue depuis la création, en 1975, de la Commission de 
lutte contre l'inflation (CLI) dont l'objectif était de limiter les augmen-
tations de prix et de revenus au Canada. À la veille de l'abandon, 
ou du moins d'une redéfinition des contrôles, et alors que l'économie 
canadienne s'apprête à entrer dans la période post-contrôle, il me 
semble pertinent de rappeler et présenter certains arguments et facteurs 
économiques reliés à cette question. Non seulement certains de ces 
facteurs et arguments économiques me semblent avoir été négligés, mais 
ils m'apparaissent comme déterminants du contexte économique général 
dans lequel vont évoluer les négociations salariales collectives et les 
politiques de prix des entreprises dans la période post-contrôle. 
Si on accepte de simplifier la question, on peut retenir que trois 
principaux éléments, extérieurs à l'économie canadienne, furent respon-
sables de la poussée initiale inflationniste des années 1973-75. Le pre-
mier de ces éléments a été la pénurie de certains produits alimentaires 
résultant de plusieurs sécheresses d'importance à travers le monde. 
Même si cet élément ne fut que de courte durée, affectant surtout les 
consommateurs, il s'est avéré une force importante dans la montée ini-
tiale des prix et dans ce que l'on a appelé la «psychose de l'inflation». 
Le deuxième élément, et peut-être le principal, a été la fixation unila-
térale du prix du pétrole par le cartel des pays producteurs (OPEP). 
Ce cartel a réussi, chacun le sait, à quadrupler le prix du pétrole. Ce 
phénomène ne pouvait être considéré comme temporaire et devait ulti-
mement comporter un ajustement dans les prix relatifs et entraîner un 
transfert réel de ressources des pays consommateurs vers les pays 
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